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Brexit,	the	separation	of	powers	and	the	role	of	the
supreme	court
The	Supreme	Court’s	role	has	changed	since	it	was	created.	Byron	Karemba	(University	of
Leeds)	looks	at	how	Brexit	is	altering	it	further	and	makes	the	case	for	a	new	conception	of	the
judicial	function	based	on	the	separation	of	powers.
When	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	Kingdom	(UKSC)	was	created,	there	was	great	emphasis
by	the	architects	of	the	Court	that	it	would	largely	assume	the	same	constitutional	status	and
functions	as	the	Appellate	Committee	of	the	House	of	Lords.	For	example,	in	the	course	of
shepherding	the	Constitutional	Reform	Act	through	Parliament,	Lord	Falconer	insisted	that:
As	to	whether	we	envisage	the	Supreme	Court	having	the	power	to	give	advisory	opinions,	no,	we	do	not.
Our	legal	system	has	never	operated	on	the	basis	that	hypothetical	questions	are	put	to	courts.	We
should	not	see	the	courts	as	having	an	advisory	function;	they	are	bodies	which	resolve	disputes	between
people	[…]	Nor	do	I	believe	it	would	be	a	particularly	good	idea	for	the	Government	to	be	able	to	refer
issues	to	the	courts	for	advisory	opinions.
Of	course	this	characterisation	of	the	contemporary	judicial	function	was	a	misnomer	then,	and	if	anything,	time	has
proven	that	the	UKSC	is	a	different	type	of	constitutional	entity	to	the	institution	which	preceded	it.	From	the
beginning,	the	transfer	of	matters	arising	from	the	devolution	settlements	from	the	Judicial	Committee	of	the	Privy
Council	to	the	new	Court	meant	that	the	final	appellate	jurisdiction	of	this	country	was	altered	in	constitutionally
significant	ways	which	are	perhaps	coming	to	the	fore	now.	The	UKSC	recently	concluded	hearings	on	a	reference
by	the	Attorney	General	and	Advocate	General	for	Scotland	(both	UK	Government	Law	Officers)	on	the	compatibility
of	the	UK	Withdrawal	from	the	European	Union	(Legal	Continuity)	(Scotland)	Bill	with	the	scheme	of	devolution	to
Scotland	in	the	Scotland	Act	1998.
The	library	of	the	Supreme	Court.	Photo:Ana	Alfaro/	Supreme	Court	via	a	CC-BY-NC-ND	2.0
licence
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Thus,	the	exigencies	of	Brexit	have	ignited	what	is	a	rather	dormant,	but	constitutionally	sensitive	part	of	the	UKSC’s
jurisdiction.	As	noted	by	Christopher	McCorkindale	and	Aileen	McHarg	on	the	UK	Constitutional	Law	Association
Blog	in	anticipation	of	these	proceedings,	this	is	the	first	time	a	legislative	measure	of	the	Holyrood	Parliament	has
been	referred	for	judicial	scrutiny	through	the	mode	laid	down	in	s	33	of	the	Scotland	Act	1998.	Despite	the
devolution	reference	jurisdiction	being	previously	invoked	in	respect	of	two	Bills	of	the	National	Assembly	for	Wales,
the	combination	of	the	proceedings’	intrusion	into	the	legislative	process	and	their	detachment	from	‘a	dispute
between	parties’	appear	to	militate	against	the	traditional	instincts	about	the	judicial	function	emphasised	by	Lord
Falconer	in	the	House	of	Lords	in	2004.	However,	this	post	argues	that	this	aspect	of	the	UKSC’s	jurisdiction	is	just
but	one	element	which	requires	us	to	reconsider	the	traditional	conception	of	the	judicial	function,	and	concomitantly,
how	we	configure	the	doctrine	of	the	separation	of	powers	as	an	analytical	tool	for	understanding	the	relationship
between	the	judiciary	and	the	political	branches.
The	traditional	conception
In	explaining	the	orthodox	conception	of	the	judicial	function	in	the	British	constitutional	tradition,	materials	from
Australia	are	particularly	instructive.	As	a	function	of	the	‘text	and	structure’	of	their	Federal	Constitution	(and	some
State	constitutions),	the	Australian	judiciary	has	had	to	provide	constitutive	accounts	of	the	judicial	function	which
evidently	build	on	shared	theories	about	the	nature	of	the	judicial	power.	For	example,	in	the	aftermath	of	a
controversy	concerning	the	employment	of	judges	on	Royal	Commissions	in	Victoria	in	the	1920s,	the	then	Chief
Justice	of	that	State	issued	a	Memorandum	which	captures	this	orthodoxy	well.	The	relevant	part	of	the	so-called
Irvine	Memorandum	explains:
The	duty	of	His	Majesty’s	Judges	is	to	hear	and	determine	issues	of	fact	and	law	arising	between	the	King
and	the	subject,	or	between	subject	and	subject,	presented	in	a	form	enabling	judgment	to	be	passed
upon	them,	and	when	passed	to	be	enforced	by	process	of	law.	There	begins	and	ends	the	function	of	the
judiciary.	It	is	mainly	due	to	the	fact	that,	in	modern	times,	at	least,	the	judges	in	all	British	communities
have,	except	in	rare	cases,	confined	themselves	to	this	function	[…]	Parliament,	supported	by	wise	public
opinion,	has	jealously	guarded	the	Bench	from	the	danger	of	being	drawn	into	the	region	of	political
controversy	[emphasis	supplied].
In	this	ideal,	the	necessity	of	‘issues	of	fact	and	law’	arising	in	a	dispute	between	conventional	legal	persons	sets	the
scope	in	which	the	judicial	function	can	be	performed.	And	as	evident	in	the	latter	half	of	the	Memorandum,	limiting
the	judicial	function	to	this	form	has	the	related	separation-of-powers	benefit	of	insulating	the	judiciary	from	the
‘region	of	political	controversy.’	Yet,	as	we	witnessed	in	the	proceedings	relating	to	the	Legal	Continuity	(Scotland)
Bill,	the	devolution	reference	jurisdiction	of	the	UKSC	cuts	across	all	three	limbs	of	this	view	of	the	judicial	function.
Judicial	decision-making	in	this	context	is	removed	from	(1)	issues	of	fact	(2)	arising	in	a	dispute	between	legal
persons,	and	of	greater	constitutional	significance,	(3)	it	makes	provision	for	judicial	intervention	into	the	most
supremely	political	contexts	of	all	i.e.	the	legislative	process	of	an	elected	Parliament.
Therefore,	we	can	either	deny	the	reference	jurisdiction	as	being	a	proper	exercise	of	the	judicial	function	as	has
indeed	been	suggested	by	Jeremy	Waldron,	or	we	can	construct	an	account	of	the	judicial	function	which	captures
the	expansiveness	of	the	competence	of	the	contemporary	judiciary.	In	Waldron’s	account,	a	mechanism	such	as	the
UKSC’s	reference	jurisdiction	‘amounts	in	effect	to	a	final	stage	in	a	multicameral	legislative	process,	with	the	court
operating	like	a	traditional	senate.’	While	the	idea	of	conceiving	the	Court	as	an	extension	of	the	legislature	may
have	traction	in	this	context	given	that	judicial	scrutiny	of	a	legislative	measure	takes	place	before	promulgation,
Waldron’s	theory	is	handicapped	by	the	fact	that	unlike	a	“traditional	senate”,	the	Court	lacks	powers	of	amendment
or	revision	which	would	be	common	to	a	legislative	chamber.	Alternatively,	as	I	argue	below,	we	can	conceive	the
reference	jurisdiction	as	indicative	of	a	new	understanding	of	the	judicial	function.
Constituting	the	new	judicial	function
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The	novelty	of	the	devolution	reference	jurisdiction	was	made	evident	in	2012	when	the	first	ever	reference	was
made	on	the	compatibility	of	two	provisions	in	the	Local	Government	By-Laws	(Wales)	Bill	with	the	then	scheme	of
devolution	to	Wales.	Prompted	by	counsel	for	the	Attorney	General	in	that	reference,	the	UKSC	had	to	issue
guidance	on	the	procedure	to	be	adhered	to	in	these	proceedings.	This	extended	to	consideration	of	whether	the
devolved	legislatures	could	appropriately	be	designated	as	‘respondents’	in	these	proceedings.	We	know	from	Lord
Hope’s	interpretation	of	the	Supreme	Court	Practice	Direction	10	and	Rule	41	of	the	Rules	of	Court	that	the
‘respondent’	–	to	the	extent	that	this	term	has	utility	in	this	context	–	can	either	be	a	‘relevant	officer’	on	whom	a	copy
of	the	reference	filed	with	the	Court	has	been	served,	or	a	‘relevant	officer’	who	registers	an	interest	in	the
proceedings	and	does	so	within	the	prescribed	temporal	frame.	As	Lord	Hope	canvassed	in	the	Reference	on	the
Local	Government	Byelaws	(Wales)	Bill	it	is	indeed	possible	to	have	a	reference	made	to	the	Court	in	which	no
qualifying	‘relevant	officer’	has	an	interest	[92].	Furthermore,	Lord	Hope	also	made	this	noteworthy	observation:
[P]roceedings	on	a	reference	under	the	devolution	legislation	are	sui	generis	and	the	law	officers	appear
before	the	Court	in	their	capacity	as	a	‘relevant	officer’	not	as	a	conventional	party	or	respondent	[93].
This	dispensing	of	the	conventional	setting	in	which	the	judicial	function	is	exercised	is	symptomatic	of	the	broader
dynamism	which	inheres	in	the	contemporary	judicial	function.	The	statutorily	grounded	mechanism	to	issue
declarations	of	incompatibility	under	section	4	of	the	Human	Rights	Act	1998	goes	to	the	same	point.	In	both
contexts,	the	exercise	of	the	judicial	function	is	not	concerned	with	ascertainment	or	declaration	of	pre-existing	rights
and	liabilities	between	disputatious	parties.	In	reality,	the	judicial	function	in	both	contexts	is	constructed	around	the
determination	of	(legal)	rules	which	are	to	guide	the	action	of	the	branches	of	government	themselves.
In	the	specific	context	of	the	devolution	reference	jurisdiction,	this	determination	of	legality	takes	place	in	the	course
of	statutory	interpretation	which,	according	to	one	jurist,	‘is	both	the	primary	and	most	important	function	of	a
supreme	court.’	We	know	from	Lord	Nicholls’	speech	in	R	(Jackson)	v	Attorney	General	that	in	own	constitutional
arrangements,	‘statutory	interpretation	is	properly	cognisable	by	a	court	of	law	even	[if]	it	relates	to	the	legislative
process’	[51].	It	is	this	quest	for	an	authoritative	exposition	of	statutory	provisions	by	personnel	in	the	executive
branch	which	gives	rise	to	the	judicial	function	in	the	context	of	the	reference	jurisdiction.
Conceiving	a	new	separation	of	powers
In	a	relatively	recent	article,	Masterman	and	Wheatle	argue	that	the	UK	constitution	is,	and	ought	to	be	seen	as
amenable	to	some	form	of	separation	of	powers	analysis.	My	contention	is	that	the	shift	in	our	conception	of	the
judicial	function	should	be	reflected	in	this.	The	reference	jurisdiction	of	the	UKSC	is	just	but	one	element	which
exemplifies	this	shift.	In	this	new	separation	of	powers,	the	ambit	of	the	judicial	power	is	framed	by	reference	to	an
overarching	principle	of	legality	as	opposed	to	the	old	assumptions	about	the	form	in	which	the	judicial	function	is
exercised.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	A	version	of	this
post	first	appeared	on	the	UK	Constitutional	Law	Association	Blog.	It	has	been	reproduced	here	with	the	permission
of	the	editors.
Byron	Karemba	is	a	research	student	at	the	University	of	Leeds.	He	is	grateful	to	Paul	Scott	and	the	editors	for
feedback	on	an	earlier	draft.	The	usual	disclaimer	applies.
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